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A CRITIQUE OF EU REFUGEE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: 
ON LAW, POLICY AND DECENTRALISATION
Nika Bačić Selanec*
Summary: This article aims to uncover the legal background behind 
the European Union’s response to the ongoing refugee crisis. Pursu-
ant to its Agenda on Migration, the EU has implemented a wide set of 
legal, financial and operative measures to face the challenges of the 
mass inflows of refugees onto its territory. Some of these measures 
aim to respond to what was classified as the most pressing duty of 
saving lives in the Mediterranean and strengthening EU external bor-
ders. Others aim to uphold the EU’s international obligations and val-
ues by assisting the third countries most affected. A core set of meas-
ures was then introduced to repair the existing EU legal framework on 
asylum, proven as dysfunctional when faced with the unprecedented 
pressures of incoming refugees. These measures came about in the 
context of an already deficient Common European Asylum System, 
yet the Union still decided to place the Dublin Regulation as a starting 
point for all operative plans dealing with the refugee crisis within the 
Union territory. Although the Dublin Regulation was not envisaged 
to function in a time of crisis, all the EU measures introduced were 
in effect merely exceptions to that inherently inefficient system. On 
the other hand, a true emergency mechanism was not something the 
Union lacked during the crucial moments of creating an operative plan 
for the Agenda. The existing Union framework on asylum creates two 
quite different concepts for determining the Member State responsi-
ble for providing international protection to refugees – one for regular 
asylum procedures, and another for emergency situations. By choos-
ing the former instead of the latter, the EU went for the wrong op-
tion. The author’s position is that the Union in its centralised capacity 
failed to activate an efficient legal framework to respond to a crisis of 
the present magnitude, thus creating a perfect ground for individual 
Member States to become the main actors of crisis management, each 
invoking its own political particularities and national interests. The 
outcome was polarisation of the Member States, every day moving 
farther away from the ever-closer Union. 
* Nika Bačić Selanec, LLM (UMich), Research Assistant and PhD Candidate, University of 
Zagreb, Faculty of Law. The author would like to thank Goran Selanec for his valuable input 
in crystallising this article’s main thesis. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, the biggest this world has seen 
in decades, has been subject to much debate – both in public, through 
the eyes of the media, but also in the sphere of politics. What still seems 
to be lacking, however, is a coherent critique of the crisis’ legal setting.  In 
other words, what has the European Union actually done in pursuing its 
legislative and operative agenda for managing mass inflows of refugees, 
as compared to what other legal avenues were available? Is the EU re-
sponse adequate, and is there anything else the EU could or should have 
done? This paper aims to provide answers to these questions, filling in 
the missing pieces of the legal story. 
The main claim of the author is the following. Most measures taken 
by the European Union in responding to the refugee crisis present noth-
ing more than ad hoc solutions to the problems already raging on its 
territory or at its borders.  The remaining measures are simply efforts to 
prevent the refugee crisis reaching the Union territory in the first place. 
The Union still lacks a coherent and systematic approach to crisis man-
agement in a timely manner – something that is, ironically, well within 
its legislative and operational capabilities. Instead, political particulari-
ties of individual Member States now seem to be prevailing, blocking an 
approach of solidarity that ought to be taken by an ever-closer and in-
tegrated Union. Although certain Member States’ efforts did ultimately 
take effect, and the overall response of a decentralised Union cannot be 
categorised as inactive or completely inadequate, much more could and 
should have been done by the Union in its centralised capacity, taking 
great pride in its underlying values of fundamental rights protection.
The arguments to prove this claim will be presented in the following 
manner. 
The first section will dissect the legal and political measures already 
taken by the European Union and will explain the efforts currently un-
derway. The author will try to categorise these measures, aiming to un-
cover the background stories behind the formal actions. 
The second section will then place these measures in the perspective 
of the Union’s current legal framework of the Common European Asylum 
System, revealing the system’s downsides and vagaries. 
The third section will then explain what other legal measures within 
the Union legal framework were available as an alternative.  It will deal 
with measures that the European Union could have taken in its uniform 
capacity, using the existing mechanisms of its legal system to more ef-
fectively and in a timelier manner respond to migratory pressures that 
ultimately escalated into a true refugee crisis. 
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The final section will try to explain the consequences of the Union 
policy in managing the unstoppable mass inflows of refugees, political 
and otherwise. It will also assess its impact for the future of an ever-
closer Union, or at least the idea that should have existed thereof.
Some concluding remarks will follow.
2 Managing the refugee crisis: Operationalising the European Agen-
da on Migration 
Escalation of migratory pressures in the early 2010s came as no 
surprise to the general public considering the geopolitical background of 
the Middle East and North Africa, and especially the raging Syrian civil 
war. Yet no European actor took the matter seriously enough until the 
migratory pressures resulted in grave tragedies and numberless lives lost 
at sea of those fleeing war and persecution in their respective countries 
of origin. Starting with the 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck that cost the lives 
of more than 500 migrants en route for Italy, the Mediterranean soon 
started counting the loss of lives in thousands.1 The main turning point 
for the European Union came after the media outburst following the 19 
April 2015 tragedy, when a migrant boat sank just off Libya resulting in 
more than 800 dead men, women and children. Apparently, early 2015 
witnessed a 1,600% increase in the number of migrants drowning while 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean as compared to the same period 
in early 2014.2
A European Council meeting on 23 April 2015 was the first to call 
upon the Commission to respond to the need to undertake coordinat-
ed Union action to prevent further loss of life at sea by strengthening 
the presence of naval forces in the Mediterranean and fighting human 
smugglers and traffickers.3  The European Council also reiterated the 
importance of ‘preventing illegal migration flows and reinforcing internal 
solidarity and responsibility’ of the Member States. Just a few days later, 
the European Parliament continued in that vein, adopting a resolution to 
urge both the EU and the Member States to ‘build on the existing coop-
1 UNHCR reports that 3,500 lives were lost in 2014, and 1,600 in the first quarter of 2015. 
For more information on Mediterranean tragedies, see UNHCR, ‘New Mediterranean Boat 
Tragedy May Be Biggest Ever, Urgent Action is Needed Now’ (19 April 2015) <http://www.
unhcr.org/5533c2406.html> accessed 30 December 2015. 
2 See ‘What’s Behind the Surge in Refugees Crossing the Mediterranean Sea’ The New 
York Times (New York, 20 April 2015) <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/20/
world/europe/surge-in-refugees-crossing-the-mediterranean-sea-maps.html?_r=0> ac-
cessed 30 December 2015. 
3 Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – Statement, paras 1-3 <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2015/04/23-special-euco-state-
ment/> accessed 30 December 2015.
76 Nika Bačić Selanec: A Critique of EU Refugee Crisis Management: On Law, Policy and ...
eration in the Common European Asylum System and do everything pos-
sible to prevent further loss of life at sea’.4 All relevant actors were called 
upon ‘to take a comprehensive European approach and step up fair shar-
ing of responsibility and solidarity between Member States’.5
The Commission’s response to the migratory pressures soon fol-
lowed the European Council and the Parliament, bringing about the 13 
May 2015 European Agenda on Migration6 as a cornerstone of the Un-
ion’s actions for tackling the refugee crisis. 
The Agenda set out a core system of EU measures in pursuing a con-
sistent and clear common policy on migration. A new, more European ap-
proach was set as a priority. In other words, coordinated action at the 
European level, based on principles of solidarity and shared responsibility, 
was presented as the only effective way for Europe to meet its international 
and ethical obligations7 towards those fleeing persecution and war.8 
The system of measures envisaged in the Agenda may be categorised 
in three main groups based on their material and territorial scope. The 
first group of measures aims to resolve what was classified as the most 
pressing duty of saving lives at sea,9 together with protecting the Union 
borders. The second one encompasses Union efforts in the international 
arena to uphold its international obligations and values. The ultimate 
goal of the second set of measures is yet again to secure the Union ex-
ternal borders, alongside the humanitarian approach.10 The final group 
of introduced emergency measures aims to repair internally the existing 
European policy on asylum that has proven to fall short faced with the 
pressure of thousands of migrants.11 These measures specifically include 
4 European Parliament, Resolution on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU 
migration and asylum policies, 2015/2660(RSP) para 1. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2015/2660(RSP)> accessed 30 Decem-
ber 2015.
5 ibid, para 3; see also Article 80 TFEU.
6 Commission ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ (Communication) COM (2015) 240 final 
(hereinafter: the European Agenda on Migration, the Agenda on Migration, or Agenda).
7 Referring to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that is 
signed and ratified by all EU Member States: UN General Assembly, ‘Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees’ (28 July 1951) UN, Treaty Series vol 189, 137; as amended by the 
‘Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’ (31 January 1967) UNTS vol 606, 267 (herein-
after: Geneva Convention).
8 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 2.
9 ibid: ‘The immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need. The plight of thou-
sands of migrants putting their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean has shocked us all.’
10 ibid: ‘we need to use the EU’s global role and wide range of tools to address the root 
causes of migration….Upholding our international commitments and values while securing 
our borders….’
11  ibid: ‘Emergency measures have been necessary because the collective European policy 
on the matter has fallen short. …across Europe, there are serious doubts about whether 
our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants…’
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quotas for internal relocation, the revision of the Dublin Regulation,12 
and the more stringent application of CEAS rules.
So far, two sets of implementation packages have been introduced 
by the European legislator or the Commission to operationalise the meas-
ures envisaged in the Agenda on Migration.13 Instead of focusing on many 
technicalities in the implementation packages, this author will categorise 
the undertaken measures pursuant to the objectives these measures aim 
to pursue, taking into account their material and territorial scope.
2.1 Saving lives in the Mediterranean and strengthening EU borders
Set out as the immediate priority for Union action, saving lives in 
the Mediterranean while also strengthening the Union’s maritime borders 
was the immediate priority for action and was actually the most effective 
set of measures undertaken by the Union.
The EU has been funding its agency Frontex14 to patrol the Mediter-
ranean waters since 2006, starting with the Frontex-led Operation Po-
seidon in the eastern Mediterranean just off the Greek shores. Shortly 
after the aforementioned Lampedusa shipwreck, another naval operation 
called Mare Nostrum was launched in 2013 by the Italian navy to patrol 
waters close to Italian shores. In October 2014, coordination of the op-
eration was taken over by Frontex, now EU-funded and renamed Opera-
tion Triton. This operation, like the Greek counterpart Operation Posei-
don, aimed not only at preventing further loss of life at sea, but also at 
reinforcing EU maritime border surveillance.15  Following the measures 
called upon by the European Council and later set out in the Agenda on 
Migration, the Commission tripled the capacities and budgetary assets 
12 European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged 
in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] OJ 
L180 (hereinafter: the Dublin Regulation) 31–59.
13 For detailed information on the exact measures implemented by the European legislator 
or the Commission, see Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘European Agenda on Mi-
gration – Legislative documents’ <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/poli-
cies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/index_en.htm> ac-
cessed 30 December 2015 or Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘European Agenda 
on Migration – Factsheets’ <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/
european-agenda-migration/background-information/index_en.htm> accessed 30 Decem-
ber 2015. 
14 The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union was established by Council Regula-
tion (EC) 2007/2004 [2004] OJ L349.
15 See European Council & Council of the EU, Migratory Pressures, ‘Saving Lives at Sea 
and Targeting Criminal Networks’ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migrato-
ry-pressures/saving-lives-targeting-criminal-networks/> accessed 30 December 2015.  
78 Nika Bačić Selanec: A Critique of EU Refugee Crisis Management: On Law, Policy and ...
of these Frontex-led, now joint-operations16 Triton and Poseidon in 2015 
and 2016.17
In addition to saving lives in the Mediterranean, the EU actions, 
based on the Agenda, included targeting criminal networks of smugglers 
and traffickers of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean. For that 
purpose, the Council Decision of 18 May 201518 formally established for 
the first time an EU military operation, named EUNAVFOR Med.19 The 
operation was launched in June 2015, first focusing on the surveillance 
and assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks. As of Oc-
tober 2015, the operation was given an expanded mandate to include ac-
tions of boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of sus-
picious vessels, all under the conditions prescribed under international 
law.20 This expanded mandate was followed by renaming the operation 
Operation Sophia.21   
Results of the EU-coordinated naval operations for saving lives in the 
Mediterranean very soon emerged. The number of people who drowned or 
disappeared at sea in their attempts to reach European shores declined 
dramatically in the months following the deployment of naval forces. The 
16 Frontex reports that 26 European countries are taking part in joint operations by deploy-
ing experts and technical equipment: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and UK. For more information, see Frontex, ‘Frontex Expands Its Joint Op-
eration Triton’ (26 May 2015) <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-expands-its-joint-
operation-triton-udpbHP> accessed 30 December 2015 .
17 European Parliament Resolution of 7 July 2015 on the Council position on Draft amend-
ing budget No 5/2015 of the European Union for the financial year 2015 - Responding to 
migratory pressures (09768/2015 – C8-0163/2015 – 2015/2121(BUD)). Frontex reports 
that the Commission will provide an additional EUR 26.25 million to strengthen Operation 
Triton in Italy and Poseidon in Greece from June 2015 until the end of the year. The budget 
for Triton for 2015 will amount to EUR 38 million and EUR 18 million for Poseidon. See 
Frontex, ‘Frontex Expands its Joint Operation Triton’ (26 May 2015) <http://frontex.eu-
ropa.eu/news/frontex-expands-its-joint-operation-triton-udpbHP> accessed 30 December 
2015. 
18 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military opera-
tion in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) [2015] OJ L122/31
19 The operation does not deploy or create the EU’s own military assets, but is based on the 
operative contributions of 14 EU Member States (BE, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, LT, LU, 
NL, SE, SI, UK). For more information on this Council-coordinated military operation and 
the rules on its phases and functioning, see European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean, 
‘Operation Sophia’ <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-
med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf> accessed 30 December 2015. 
20 See European Council & Council of the EU, ‘EUNAVFOR Med: EU agrees to start 
the active phase of the operation against human smugglers and to rename it “Opera-
tion Sophia”’ (28 September 2015) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/09/28-eunavfor/> accessed 30 December 2015.
21 The operation was renamed Sophia after the name given to a baby that was born on a 
ship participating in the EUNAVFOR Med operation. 
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death rate between January and April 2015 was 1 in 16, or 6.2%, while 
the numbers between April and June of the same year were significant-
ly reduced to 1 in 427, or 0.23%. Amnesty International marked these 
numbers as a massive improvement in the situation.22
On the other hand, strengthening the EU’s external land borders, 
deemed as fundamental for managing the migration flows within the 
EU,23 fell short of the success witnessed in the maritime actions.
The basic idea behind the Agenda on Migration was to achieve ef-
fective control of the EU’s external borders by strengthening the margin-
al role and capacities of Frontex as an EU-based agency, both in opera-
tive and financial terms.24 Frontex was determined to work on the ground 
with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register, fingerprint (or 
return some of) the incoming refugees and migrants by utilising new tech-
nologies25 to create a more effective border control system. The so-called 
hotspot approach was envisaged by the Commission as a coordinated op-
eration of the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol to 
provide help to the frontline Member States. The intention was to activate 
the system in all Member States dealing with mass influxes at the EU’s 
external borders, such as Italy, Greece, but also Hungary and Croatia as 
the first Member States on the Western Balkans route.26 Due to the po-
litically sensitive connotation of being referred to as a hotspot area, both 
of the latter countries refused. The newly established Migration Manage-
ment Support Teams (MMST) that put the hotspot system into operation 
were deployed only to Greece and Italy.27 
Mass inflows of refugees and migrants coming towards the Union 
through the Western Balkans route, however, required assistance to be 
22 Amnesty International, ‘A Safer Sea: The Impact of Increased Search and Rescue Opera-
tions in the Central Mediterranean, Public Statement (9 July 2015)  <https://www.am-
nesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0320592015ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 30 December 
2015.
23 European Council & Council of the EU, Migratory Pressures, ‘Strengthening the EU’s 
External Borders’ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/
strengthening-external-borders/> accessed 30 November 2015.
24 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 6, 10.
25 See, for example, Commission Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eu-
rodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints, SWD(2015) 150 final; or 
Regulation 1052/2013 of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR): an information-exchange system designed to improve management of 
the EU external borders [2013] OJ L295; see also the Agenda on Migration (n 6) 11, on the 
initiative of introducing ‘Smart Borders’.
26 For more information on the Western Balkans route, see ‘Migratory Routes Map’ <http://
frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/> accessed 30 December 
2015.
27 See Commission, ‘Managing the refugees crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and 
legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration’ (Communication) COM (2015) 
490 final/2 - Annex II: Migration Management Support Teams working in ‘hotspot’ areas.
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provided to the most affected Member States who refused to be consid-
ered a hotspot. The Commission thus responded by strengthening the 
capacities of the Frontex-coordinated Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABIT),28 and emphasising to the Member States that they can request 
the deployment of such teams at any time, and receive immediate border 
guard support.29 Through MMST, RABIT, bilateral agreements or some 
other form of cooperation, Frontex has so far dispatched border sup-
port to Greece, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia.30 Howev-
er, all these Frontex-coordinated actions have proven incapable of much 
success or results in the context of the unstoppable inflows of refugees 
coming through the Western Balkans route,31 as well as in relation to 
the complex problems faced by the Member States in their effective and 
timely registration and processing.32 
2.2 The international arena
The Agenda on Migration sets out to tackle the global issues of the 
refugee crisis as another of the Union’s main priorities, emphasising the 
importance of a broad approach and strong cooperation with the coun-
tries of origin and transit.33 Key actions to be undertaken by the Union 
in the international arena are to address the root causes of irregular 
migration through development, cooperation with third countries and 
providing international humanitarian or financial assistance.34 In addi-
tion to the Union truly stepping up to its humanitarian obligations, this 
effectively means that the Union is trying to find logistical solutions for 
the refugee crisis to stay outside the EU external borders.
28 ibid, ANNEX III: The Rapid Border Intervention Teams mechanism (RABIT). The RABIT 
mechanism was established by Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 [2007] OJ L199 whereby 
Frontex funds and deploys technical and human resources from EU Member States.
29 ibid, 6. 
30 See Leaders’ Meeting on Refugee Flows Along the Western Balkans Route, ‘Leaders’ 
Statement’ available at <http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.
pdf> accessed 30 December 2015
31 For Frontex facts and figures on the Western Balkans route, see <http://ec.europa.eu/
news/2015/docs/eastern_border_wb_2015_presentation.pdf> accessed 30 November 2015.
32 A special meeting on the challenges of dealing with the unprecedented flow of refu-
gees and migrants along the Eastern Mediterranean-Western Balkans route was also 
subject to a special meeting of leaders of the affected EU and non-EU countries in Brus-
sels on 25 October 2015, initiated by the European Commission. For more details, see 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5924_en.htm> or <http://ec.europa.eu/
news/2015/10/20151025_en.htm>. The ‘Leaders’ Statement’ is available at <http://
ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.pdf>. All sites accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2015.
33 See Agenda on Migration (n 6) 7; see also European Council & Council of the EU, Migra-
tory Pressures, ‘Preventing Illegal Migration Flows’ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
policies/migratory-pressures/preventing-illegal-migration-flows/> accessed 30 December 
2015. 
34 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 10.
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In June 2015, the European Council called upon the Union to ‘step 
up cooperation with Turkey and other relevant countries in the Middle 
East, including Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon’.35 Following that commitment, 
in September 2015 the Council agreed to ‘assist Lebanon, Jordan, Tur-
key and other countries in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis and 
mobilise at least €1 billion in additional funding for the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme’.36
Partnership with countries of origin and transit by means of bi-
lateral and regional cooperation frameworks on migration would take 
place by ‘stepping up the role on migration of EU Delegations in key 
third countries’,37 by technical and operative support given to those third 
countries by means of deploying ‘European migration liaison officers’38 
in EU Delegations and, finally, by providing those third countries with 
‘substantial financial assistance’.39
The most intensive cooperation and political dialogue has been made 
with Turkey as the country hosting the greatest number of refugees 
worldwide.40 In addition to strengthening cooperation to more effectively 
prevent irregular migration, the joint EU-Turkey action aimed to support 
Syrian refugees and their hosting communities in Turkey, discouraging 
them from reaching the Union borders and reducing their incentive to 
move towards the EU. In exchange, the Union would provide Turkey with 
substantial operative and financial assistance.41 
In a broader context,42 supporting the efforts of hosting refugees 
35 European Council, European Council Meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions, 
Brussels, 26 June 2015 (OR en) EUCO 22/15, 5.
36 See European Council & Council of the EU, Migratory Pressures, ‘Preventing Illegal Mi-
gration Flows’ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/pre-
venting-illegal-migration-flows/> accessed 30 December 2015. 
37 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 8.
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 [2004] OJ L64/1: ‘The Im-
migration Liaison Officers are representatives of the Member States who are posted in a 
non-Member State in order to facilitate the measures taken by the EU to combat irregular 
immigration’.
39 See Agenda on Migration (n 6) 8: ‘The EU is a leading international donor for refugees 
with EUR 200 million in ongoing projects from development assistance and over EUR 1 
billion of humanitarian assistance dedicated to refugees and IDPs since the beginning of 
2014’.
40 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council ‘Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe - The Role of EU External Action, JOIN 
(2015)40 final, 5.
41 For more information, see ‘EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan’ <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/
migration/docs/20151016-eu-revised-draft-action-plan_en.pdf> accessed 5 December 2015.
42 For other types of global humanitarian assistance initiated by the EU see, for exam-
ple Commission, International Cooperation and Development, ‘Emergency Trust Fund 
for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in 
Africa’ <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/emergency-trust-fund-stability-and-addressing-
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from Syria and Iraq, the EU mobilised EUR 855 million in 2015 for hu-
manitarian assistance within those countries, but also within refugee 
camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.43 The European Union has also 
stepped up its support for the non-EU Western Balkans countries, such 
as Serbia and Macedonia, which are currently receiving unprecedented 
flows of refugees on their way to the EU. 44 
In addition to providing assistance to third countries hosting refu-
gees, the EU has agreed to resettle a certain number of persons in clear 
need of international protection from third countries to the EU Member 
States through multilateral and national schemes. The Agenda on Mi-
gration aimed to introduce this resettlement mechanism to improve the 
management of legal migration and asylum flows. On 25 June 2015, 
the European Council agreed45 that all Member States would participate 
in resettling 20,000 people in need of international protection from the 
most affected and endangered areas, pursuant to a specific distribution 
key.46 Details of the proposed resettlement were set down in the Council 
conclusions of 20 July 2015.47 Introducing this measure, and taking over 
20,000 people in need of international protection from third countries 
to the European Union on purely humanitarian grounds may surely be 
welcomed. However, this measure must be viewed in a broader context to 
reveal its true impact. Before the Commission proposal on the EU-based 
act on resettlement, Member States had since 2013 already pledged in 
their individual capacities to resettle 38,000 refugees from third coun-
tries into their own territories. Interestingly enough, 78% of those places 
root-causes-irregular-migration-and-displaced-persons_en> accessed 30 November 2015; 
Commission, ‘Member State and Commission Contributions to World Food Programme’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migra-
tion/proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_
crisis_annex_5_en.pdf> accessed 30 November 2015; and Commission, ‘The EU Regional 
Trust Fund (“MADAD Trust Fund”) in Response to the Syrian Crisis’ <http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implemen-
tation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_annex_6_en.pdf> 
accessed 30 November 2015.
43 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, ‘Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action’ JOIN 
(2015) 40 final, 5
44 ibid, 6: ‘Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were provided humani-
tarian aid of EUR 1.75 million’.
45 European Council (n 35) 2.
46 The distribution key was based on: a) the size of the population (40% weighting); b) the 
total GDP (40% weighting); c) the average number of asylum applications per one million in-
habitants over the period 2010-2014 (10% weighting); and d) the unemployment rate (10% 
weighting). For more information, see Commission, ‘On a European resettlement scheme’ 
(Recommendation) C(2015) 3560 final, 3.
47 Conclusions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council on resettling through multilateral and national schemes 20,000 persons 
in clear need of international protection, 22 July 2015 (OR. en) 11130/15.
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were pledged by Germany (30,000 places, as compared to the Union’s 
20,000 in 2015), 7% by Sweden, while all other EU countries pledged 
only 14%.48 
Finally, the last international aspect of operationalising the Agenda 
on Migration is an attempt to more effectively prevent abuses of the Eu-
ropean asylum system. In the Agenda, the Commission reported that too 
many requests were unfounded: ‘in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests 
resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asy-
lum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of Member States to 
provide swift protection to those in need’.49 To reinforce the fight against 
abuses, the Union had to find a way to more easily reject unfounded 
asylum applications from third country nationals who do not require a 
visa to come to the EU, and who do not fulfil the conditions to be granted 
asylum.50 Following that reasoning, the Council adopted conclusions on 
20 July 2015,51 calling upon the Commission to designate certain third 
countries as ‘safe countries of origin’.52 
Marking countries from where asylum seekers come as ‘safe coun-
tries of origin would allow swift processing of unfounded asylum applica-
tions’53  and the effective return of those applicants to their countries of 
origins or some other safe third countries.54 This would, in essence, mean 
that asylum applications of persons coming from third countries desig-
nated as safe would be presumed as unfounded, although in each case 
48 See Commission, ‘Relocation and Resettlement Factsheet’ <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/
docs/relocation_and_resettlement_factsheet_en.pdf> accessed 30 November 2015.
49 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 12.
50 In other words, they are not being persecuted, subjected to torture or inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment in their countries of origin, nor are they under threat of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, within the 
meaning of Article 9 of Directive 2011/95/EU [2011] OJ L337.
51 Council Conclusions on safe countries of origin, Brussels, 22 July 2015 (OR. en) 
11133/15.
52 Directive 2013/32/EU sets out common criteria for the designation of safe third coun-
tries of origin by the Member States in its Annex I, which provides the following: ‘A country 
is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the ap-
plication of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it 
can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Article 9 
of Directive 2011/95/EU2 , no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict’.
53 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 13.
54 To support Member States in effectively returning asylum seekers who unfoundedly 
sought asylum in the EU to their safe countries of origin or other safe third countries, the 
Commission brought about the following documents: Commission, Recommendation of 1 
October 2015 establishing a common ‘Return Handbook to be used by Member States’ com-
petent authorities when carrying out return-related tasks’ C(2015) 6250 final; Commission, 
‘EU Action Plan on Return’ (Communication) COM (2015) 453 final.
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the authorities of the Member States would have to allow the individual 
asylum applicant a chance to prove otherwise. 
On 9 September 2015, the Commission set out a Proposal for a regu-
lation establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin – name-
ly: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. 55 This proposal is 
currently under discussion in the Council. 
2.3 Patching up the EU asylum system 
The final set of measures implemented pursuant to the European 
Agenda on Migration aims to address the downsides of the current EU 
legal framework on asylum, as applied on the Union territory in the Mem-
ber States.  As emphasised by the Commission, ‘the migration crisis … 
has revealed much about the structural limitations of EU migration pol-
icy and the tools at its disposal’.56 A ‘clear and well implemented frame-
work of a strong common asylum policy’ was outlined as the only way to 
achieve an efficient asylum system capable of responding to the ongoing 
refugee crisis of such magnitude.57 
The first action undertaken by the Commission in this regard was 
to request from the Member States a more stringent application of the 
existing legislation – the rules of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS).58 Enhancing the process of monitoring Member States’ imple-
mentation and application of the asylum rules, the Commission, soon 
after the Agenda on Migration, in September 2015, initiated 37 infringe-
ment procedures against 19 Member States for failing to transpose into 
55 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Directive 
2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection, and amending Directive 2013/32/EU’ 
COM (2015) 452 final. 
56 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 6.
57 ibid.
58 The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an EU framework of legislative instru-
ments adopted to implement the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (see 
n 7) in the EU legal system. Pursuant to Article 78(2) TFEU, CEAS comprises (a) a uniform 
status (definition) of asylum and (b) subsidiary protection; (c) a common system of tempo-
rary protection for displaced persons in the event of a massive inflow; (d) common proce-
dures for the granting of asylum or subsidiary protection status; (e) criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for 
asylum or subsidiary protection; (f) standards concerning the conditions for the reception of 
applicants for asylum or subsidiary protection; (g) partnership and cooperation with third 
countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary 
or temporary protection. For more information, see Commission, Migration and Home Af-
fairs, ‘Common European Asylum System’ <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm> accessed 28 December 2015. 
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their national laws the recently adopted directives59 that form part of 
CEAS.60 
The second, more substantive Union action in addressing the struc-
tural limitations of the asylum legal framework is also the one often 
praised as the attempt that shows the greatest EU solidarity in respond-
ing to the unstoppable inflow of migrants to the frontline Member States. 
In the Agenda on Migration, the EU was called upon to respond to the un-
precedented ‘high-volumes of arrivals’ to the Union territory by ensuring 
a ‘fair and balanced participation of all Member States’ in the common 
efforts of reception of all those in need of international protection.61  The 
measure envisaged in the Agenda was the ad hoc activation of the Article 
78(3) TFEU emergency mechanism for adopting provisional measures for 
the benefit of the Member State(s) faced with sudden and massive inflows 
of refugees. In essence, this would introduce exceptions to the applicable 
rules of the CEAS and relieve the frontline Member States most affected 
from their Dublin-imposed exclusive responsibility for processing asylum 
claims of all those who enter into their territory. Through Article 78(3) 
TFEU, the EU would activate a system of ‘relocation’ of a certain and pre-
determined number of refugees from the frontline Member States to other 
parts of the Union territory. For these purposes, ‘relocation’ is defined as 
a transfer of persons who have ‘already applied’ for international protec-
tion from the Member State in charge of examining their application to 
another EU Member State.62 
The relevance of this measure must be viewed in the context of the 
entire Union legal framework for asylum. Pursuant to the default rules of 
the CEAS Dublin Regulation,63 only those Member States where the asy-
lum seekers first enter the EU territory have an obligation to conduct the 
asylum procedures and remain responsible for providing protection to 
59 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and with-
drawing international protection [2013] OJ L180/60; Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 
2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
[2013] OJ L180/96.
60 For more information, see ANNEX VII to the Commission Communication on Managing 
the refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the Euro-
pean Agenda on Migration - Implementing the Common European Asylum System, COM 
(2015) 490 final/2. 
61 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 4: ‘Member States’ asylum systems today face unprecedented 
pressure and, with the summer arriving, the flow of people to frontline Member States will 
continue in the months to come. The EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to 
act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facili-
ties is already stretched thin’.
62 Note the difference between the terms ‘relocation’ and ‘resettlement’. While relocation 
involves transfers of asylum seekers between the EU Member States, resettlement covers 
persons in clear need of international protection who are transferred from a non-EU third 
country to an EU Member State.
63 See n 12.
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refugees.64 This obligation proves only more significant considering that 
in the EU there is no ‘positive mutual recognition’ of approved asylum de-
cisions, meaning that persons who were granted asylum do not have the 
right to move to or reside in the territories of any other Member State.65 
Activating the Article 78(3) TFEU emergency mechanism as an exception 
to the applicable Dublin system would assist the frontline countries, by 
providing that all other Member States take on part of their burden.66 The 
Member States who receive the relocated asylum seekers would become 
responsible for examining their asylum applications. 
The Agenda on Migration also provides a technical guideline on how 
to determine which proportionate number of asylum seekers each of the 
Member States would receive. The proposed ‘distribution key’ was based 
on ‘objective, quantifiable and verifiable criteria’ – namely, the size of the 
population (40%), total GDP (40%), the past numbers of asylum seekers 
and resettled refugees (10%) and the unemployment rate in the state 
concerned (10%).67 The proposed mechanism aimed not only to ensure a 
somewhat fair and balanced distribution of the given numbers of asylum 
seekers within the EU, but also to ‘reflect the capacity of the Member 
States to absorb and integrate refugees’.68 
So far, the Commission has proposed triggering the Article 78(3) 
TFEU emergency response system on two occasions. Both times the 
Council approved, and introduced two relocation schemes for a predeter-
mined number of persons in clear need of international protection for the 
benefit of the most affected frontline states – Greece and Italy. It is im-
portant to emphasise that persons for whom the two relocation systems 
64 ibid, Arts 7-15. Pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, the default rule is that the ‘Member 
State of first entry’ to the Union territory is the only one responsible for processing asylum 
claims. Certain exceptions to the rules apply, such as instances involving family reunifica-
tion, protection of minors or the humanitarian will of other Member States to take over the 
responsibility. For more information on the applicable Dublin rules, see, inter alia, N Bacic, 
‘Asylum Policy in Europe: The Competences of the European Union and Inefficiency of the 
Dublin System’ [2012] CYELP, 41, 58-59.
65 At least until they receive long term residence after having resided legally and continu-
ously in the territory of a certain Member State for five years. See Directive 2011/51/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Council Directive 
2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection [2011] OJ 
L132/1.
66 Pursuant to Protocols 21 and 22 to the Treaties, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Den-
mark do not take part in the adoption of measures pursuant to Title V TFEU, such as the 
present one, unless they notify the Commission or the Member States otherwise.
67 For example, 18.42% of a given number of asylum seekers would be relocated to Ger-
many, 14.17% to France, 9.10% to Spain, while smaller countries such as Croatia would 
take in 1.73%, or Latvia and Lithuania 1.21% and 1.16% respectively. Austria would take 
in 2.62%, Netherlands 4.35%.
68 See ANNEX I to the Agenda on Migration COM (2015) 240 final.
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apply are asylum applicants for whose nationality the average recogni-
tion rate of international protection at the EU level is more than 75%.69 
Currently, only three nationalities meet the requisite recognition rates: 
Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis.70 
The stories behind introducing these emergency response systems 
hold many complexities and will thus be further explained only in very 
general terms.
On 27 May 2015, the Commission issued its first proposal71 for the 
resettlement of 24,000 asylum seekers from Italy and 16,000 from Greece 
to other Member States, 40,000 of them in total.72 The European Council 
called for the rapid adoption of this measure, inviting all Member States 
to agree by consensus by the end of July 2015 on the distribution of such 
persons.73 Reaching a decision by unanimity on such a politically sensi-
tive issue for the first time ever in Union history proved to be more diffi-
cult than the European Council expected. As a result, the first relocation 
scheme was introduced by a Council Decision74 only on 14 September 
2015, almost 4 months after the Commission’s initial proposal in May. 
The decision was reached by consensus.
However, during the summer of 2015, 
the migratory pressure at the Southern external land and sea 
borders again sharply increased, and the shift of migration flows 
has continued from the Central to the East Mediterranean and 
the Western Balkans route towards Hungary, as a result of the 
increasing number of migrants arriving in and from Greece.75 
69 Article 3(2) of both Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and Council Decision (EU) 
2015/1601.




71 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece’ COM (2015) 286 final 
2015/125 (NLE).
72 This final number was proposed by the Commission based on the Eurostat and Frontex 
data on the number of persons who had applied for asylum in Italy or Greece in 2014 and 
in the first quarter of 2015. See Council Decision (n 71) recitals 10 and 11.
73 European Council meeting (n 35) para 4(b).
74 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional meas-
ures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece [2015] OJ 
L239/146. 
75 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary’ COM (2015) 
451 final 2015/0209 (NLE) recital 11.
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In the first eight months of 2015, approximately 116,000 irregular 
migrants arrived in Italy (10,000 of them registered), 211,000 in Greece 
(28,000 registered) and 145,000 in Hungary through the Western Bal-
kans route (3,000 registered).  Between January and July 2015, these 
three countries received 39,000, 8,000, and 98,000 asylum applications, 
respectively.76 By the end of summer 2015, Europe was facing what was 
amounting to around two-thirds of a million asylum seekers and irregu-
lar migrants.77 In that context, just 40,000 relocations proposed by the 
Commission in the first emergency relocation scheme seems marginal. 
On 9 September 2015, the Commission came out with its second 
proposal78 for the relocation of another 120,000 asylum seekers from Ita-
ly, Greece and Hungary79 – in addition to those 40,000 relocations already 
proposed. However, relying on the lessons learned from the 4-month po-
litical fight for consensus on the first proposal for just one-third of the 
relocations then being proposed, the Council implemented the second 
emergency decision80 only 12 days after the proposal. The decision was 
made by a qualified majority vote, outvoting Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic, Romania, and Slovakia.81 Interestingly enough, Hungary even reject-
ed having the relocations take place for its own benefit, which is why the 
final decision designated the Hungarian numbers for relocations to Italy 
and Greece proportionally.82
The more pressing issue of the second relocation decision, however, 
was the qualified majority by which it was passed in the Council. The 
legislative provision upon which the decision was based is the afore-
mentioned Article 78(3) TFEU, which merely states that the Council may 
adopt emergency measures, after consulting the European Parliament. 
Given the Article’s legal setting in Title V of the TFEU, the default rules 
should apply whereby the Council votes by a qualified majority unless 
explicitly stated otherwise.83 However, not all relevant legal actors seem 
to agree on that point, which is why the outvoted Slovakia and Hungary 
76 ibid, recital 12.
77 Irregular migrants in most cases are indeed refugees who would qualify for asylum, but 
did not want to apply for asylum in the frontline Member States, thus the term ‘irregular’. 
78 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional meas-
ures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary’ 
COM (2015) 451 final 2015/0209 (NLE).
79 15,600 from Italy, 50,400 from Greece, 54,000 from Hungary.
80 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional meas-
ures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece [2015] OJ 
L248/80.
81  Finland abstained.
82 Council Decision (n 80) Art 4(2).
83 See Articles 293-296 TFEU.
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both announced84 that they would file an action for the annulment85 of 
the Decision with the Court of Justice of the EU.86 
The prospect of the envisaged innovation of ‘relocations’ was seen 
as bringing much needed solidarity to the existing Dublin system. This 
encouraged the Commission also to propose making the emergency relo-
cation mechanism originally envisaged under Article 78(3) TFEU a lasting 
solution to the EU’s asylum policy problems.  ‘The EU needs a permanent 
system for sharing the responsibility for large numbers of refugees and 
asylum seekers among Member States’.87 In its proposal88 of 9 September 
2015 (the same day the second emergency relocation was proposed), the 
Commission requested that the Parliament and the Council amend the 
existing Dublin Regulation by introducing into it a permanent crisis ‘re-
location’ mechanism as an exception to the otherwise applicable Dublin 
rules. The proposal would introduce the very same mechanism of reloca-
tion that was triggered under the emergency Article 78(3) TFEU into the 
existing Dublin framework, thus making it an integral part of the Com-
mon European Asylum System, and not just an addition thereto under 
the Treaties. 
The idea was that once the emergency exception was introduced in 
the Dublin Regulation, the Commission itself would have the power to 
activate it. As proposed, the relocation regime would be triggered auto-
matically for the benefit of a certain Member State when, based on sub-
stantiated information gathered by EASO and Frontex, the Commission 
establishes that this State is 
confronted with a crisis situation jeopardizing the application of 
the Dublin Regulation due to extreme pressure characterised by 
a large and disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals or 
84 See E Zalan, ‘Hungary To Challenge Refugee Quotas In EU Court’ (EUobserver, 18 No-
vember 2015) <https://euobserver.com/migration/131158> accessed 28 December 2015 
and A Rettman, ‘Slovakia Filing Case Against EU Migrant Relocation’ (EUobserver, 30 Sep-
tember 2015). <https://euobserver.com/justice/130499> accessed 28 December 2015.
85 See Article 263 TFEU.
86 For a more detailed analysis of the legality of the qualified majority vote for the second re-
location decision, see S Peers, ‘Relocation of Asylum-Seekers in the EU: Law and Policy’ (EU 
Law Analysis, 24 September 2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.hr/2015/09/relocation-
of-asylum-seekers-in-eu-law.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_ca
mpaign=Feed:+EuLawAnalysis+(EU+Law+Analysis)> accessed 28 December 2015.
87 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 4.
88 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a crisis relocation mechanism and amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or 
a stateless person’ COM (2015) 450 final 2015/0208 (COD)
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stateless persons, which places significant demands on its asy-
lum system.89
Amending the Dublin Regulations under Article 78(2) TFEU falls 
within the Title V general rule on an ordinary legislative procedure,90 
whereby the Council votes by a qualified majority, co-legislating with the 
European Parliament. Introducing a relocation system under this con-
cept would mean bypassing the problems of the kind witnessed with out-
voted Member States under Article 78(3) TFEU by formally incorporating 
the relocation mechanism within the Dublin Regulation, which can un-
doubtedly be done by a qualified majority. 
In other words, if the Union wanted to initiate a relocation scheme, 
it would no longer have to pass each individual decision through the 
Council. Once the relocation scheme entered into the Dublin Regulation 
through an amendment that was passed in an ordinary legislative proce-
dure, it would be solely for the Commission to determine, based on objec-
tive criteria, whether there was a crisis situation that merited activating 
the relocation scheme.
Finally, the last piece of Commission action pursuant to the Agenda 
on Migration was to undertake a substantive evaluation of the Dublin 
system in 2016. In doing so, the Agenda called for ‘drawing on the experi-
ence from the relocation and resettlement mechanisms which would help 
to determine whether a revision of the legal parameters of Dublin will be 
needed to achieve a fairer distribution of asylum seekers in Europe’.91
3 Legal setting of the Agenda measures: The Dublin system as a de-
fault 
The previous sections, dissecting the measures that were envisaged 
in the Agenda on Migration and later on operationalised, support the 
conclusion that all EU actions in responding to the refugee crisis were 
either answers to the problems already occurring on the Union’s terri-
tory or at its borders, or efforts to prevent the refugee crisis reaching the 
Union in the first place. 
For example, the Mediterranean operations and the strengthening 
of external border controls, alongside the humanitarian approach, aim 
at the effective management of migration flows onto the Union territory. 
The international efforts of the Union in offering financial support to third 
countries hosting refugees undoubtedly aims at ensuring that part of 
the refugee crisis remains someone else’s concern. The resettlement of 
89 ibid, Article 33a (1).
90 Article 294 TFEU.
91 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 13.
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20,000 refugees could be seen as a way of giving something in return 
to those third countries for keeping a great deal of the problem outside 
the Union borders. Yet, the number of 20,000 seems quite marginal as 
compared to the existing number of displaced persons, especially follow-
ing the Syrian civil war. UNHCR estimates that, at the present moment, 
more than 4 million Syrian refugees are displaced in Turkey and the Mid-
dle East.92 
The final set of measures, those for addressing the proven drawbacks 
of the Union legal framework, likewise present responses to the refugee 
crisis that had already started raging on the Union territory. Activat-
ing the emergency exception to the CEAS framework under Article 78(3) 
TFEU in itself shows that the existing legal system was not functioning 
properly from the very beginning. The Union policy choice of introduc-
ing innovations to the system was presented as the only way to save the 
system from falling apart. The ‘relocation’ scheme was precisely that type 
of innovation to ease the pressure on the frontline Member States which 
would otherwise be held responsible for the refugees through the Dub-
lin rules. Under this concept, refugees who had already sought asylum 
in the frontline Member States, adhering to the existing Dublin regime, 
would then be relocated to other Member States who would take over the 
obligation of processing their asylum claims. The core problem of the Un-
ion crisis management technique lies precisely at this point: all measures 
the Union has taken presuppose that the Dublin system is a default rule 
to which all the actors comply. 
As previously stated, the Dublin system is based on the ‘country of 
first entry’ concept, making the frontline Member States, in general, the 
ones responsible for processing asylum applications and providing inter-
national protection. However, this system for allocating Member States’ 
responsibilities to examine asylum applications has long proven itself 
to be inefficient. Instead of sharing responsibilities, the system has re-
sulted in shifting the burden onto the Member States on the EU’s exter-
nal borders. The pressure placed on these states resulted in extensive 
litigation before both the Strasbourg93 and the Luxembourg94 courts a 
few years ago, before anyone could foresee a refugee crisis of the present 
magnitude. In essence, both of these cases ended by concluding that 
the stringent imposition of the Dublin rules on an over-stretched Greece 
92 See UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’ <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/
regional.php> accessed 30 November 2015. Turkey hosts more than 2.1 million Syrian refu-
gees, while 1 million of them are in Lebanon and 600,000 in Jordan.
93 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
94 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and ME and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
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violated refugees’ fundamental rights not to be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.95 In other words, the Dublin system proved to be 
inefficient even in situations verging on the normal.96
Even the Commission emphasised in the Agenda on Migration that 
‘the Dublin system is not working as it should. In 2014, five Member 
States dealt with 72% of all asylum applications EU-wide’. 97 
At this point, it must be clearly emphasised that the Dublin system 
was not envisaged to function in emergency situations. It proved itself not 
to be able to function under normal conditions, let alone in the present 
refugee crisis. ‘When the Dublin system was designed, Europe was at a 
different stage of cooperation in the field of asylum. The inflows it was 
facing were of a different nature and scale’.98
Still, all Union measures taken pursuant to the Agenda presuppose 
that the Dublin system is a default rule to which all the actors comply, 
without substantively shifting Dublin’s most problematic paradigm. This 
mainly refers to the ‘relocation mechanism’ both as an ‘emergency’ excep-
tion to CEAS under Article 78(3) TEFU and as an announced ‘permanent’ 
solution for crisis situations introduced by amendments to the Dublin 
Regulation. 
The author’s strong position is that no emergency situation and refu-
gee crisis could ever be resolved by reliance on the Dublin system and by 
introducing amendments thereto, whatever the scope and effect of those 
amendments. There are two reasons for this, which are outlined below.
Firstly, because Dublin is based on the ‘country of first entry’ con-
cept, no exception to that system can reverse its underlying rule that 
frontline Member States are always the ones ‘initially’ responsible for asy-
lum seekers. It must be reiterated that this core principle of Dublin was 
found to violate refugees’ fundamental rights even before the 2015 crisis. 
In the Agenda on Migration, the Commission nonetheless provides that 
‘the EU can provide further assistance, but the rules need to be applied 
in full. Member States are responsible for applying the Dublin system’.99 
This statement bluntly proves that the Commission insists on apply-
ing the Dublin Regulation as a default rule (which none of the Member 
States currently adheres to in practice, as will be assessed later on). It 
95 Article 3 ECHR, Articles 4 and 19 Charter; non-refoulement principle. 
96 For a more detailed analysis of the pre-crisis inefficiency and non-application of the 
Dublin system, see N Bacic, ‘Asylum Policy in Europe: The Competences of the European 
Union and Inefficiency of the Dublin System’ [2012] CYELP, 41, 62-64.
97 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 13.
98 ibid.
99 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 13.
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also shows that the Commission sees all the relocation measures un-
dertaken as ‘assistance’ provided to the ‘otherwise responsible’ Member 
States by enabling mechanisms of relieving their pressure. However, in-
sisting on adherence to the Dublin Regulation must be viewed in a broad-
er context than the Commission seems to suggest. In a situation where 
frontline Member States are being confronted with mass inflows of refu-
gees, insisting on their initial responsibility of which the other Member 
States will relieve them ‘in a spirit of solidarity’ (pursuant to the reloca-
tion scheme) brings into question the entire ‘fair sharing of responsibility’ 
concept underlying the Union common policy on asylum.100
Secondly, introducing exceptions to the Dublin Regulation by means 
of surreptitiously placing within it a relocation scheme presupposes that 
Dublin is a default rule to which all the relevant actors comply. Under 
the framework of ‘relocations’, only refugees ‘who already sought asylum 
in the frontline Member States’ adhering to the existing Dublin regime 
would be relocated to other Member States who then take over the ob-
ligation of processing their asylum claims. However, this presumption 
must again be placed in a real-life context where most refugees, espe-
cially as witnessed in the case of Croatia, do not want to seek asylum 
in frontline Member States.101 They do not submit asylum applications 
in the Member State in which they should pursuant to the Dublin rules 
which, formally, do not provide them with the right to choose a Mem-
ber State of their preference.102 The only real-life option is to let them 
100 See Article 80 TFEU. It should be acknowledged that a substantive shift of Dublin’s 
underlying principle (on initial responsibility of frontline Member States) could in theory 
bring about acceptable results for handling a refugee crisis. However, this substantive shift 
would have to distinguish a default system in times of crisis from a default system in nor-
mal situations. When faced with an emergency, the default rule would have to be the initial 
responsibility of all Member States in a spirit of solidarity. The current proposals for the 
Dublin amendments still fail to do so and insist on introducing exceptions to the generally 
applicable rules on frontline Member States’ initial responsibility. Those frontline Member 
States are then aided by transferring their responsibility to other Member States. In other 
words, all proposed amendments still presuppose that crisis measures are only an excep-
tion to the default Dublin rules. This initial responsibility of frontline Member States is 
precisely what fosters the mutual feeling of distrust and makes it easy to oppose solidarity, 
which in practice should occur once the responsibilities are taken over by other Member 
States. There is no other way to achieve true solidarity in times of crisis unless all Member 
States are ab initio legally responsible, thus being placed at the same starting point.
101 Based on unpublished information available to the author, fewer than 20 people have 
sought asylum in Croatia since the redirection of the Western Balkans route to this country 
on 16 September 2015. Since that day, more than 465,000 refugees have crossed through 
Croatia on their path to other EU Member States, primarily Germany, Austria or Sweden. 
See Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, ‘Information on Accepting and Ac-
commodating Migrants in Croatia’ <http://www.mup.hr/219671.aspx> accessed 5 Decem-
ber 2015 
102 The Dublin Regulation does not impose an obligation on refugees to apply for asylum in 
the Member State of their entry into Union territory per se. However, Member States where 
they seek asylum may send them back to other Member States through which they entered 
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through, disregarding the Dublin legal framework. The alternative is to 
violate the Geneva Convention and the Member States’ international and 
humanitarian obligations. In other words, this alternative is refoulement 
and violation of refugees’ human rights as underlying values of the Union 
legal order protected by the Charter, as well as the European Convention 
of Human Rights. So far, few Member States have chosen this alternative 
in the name of salvaging the Dublin system.
4 Was there an alternative? The crisis management system within 
the CEAS
The author submits that the Union’s policy choice of saving the en-
tire Common European Asylum System by introducing the exceptions to 
the default Dublin rule on frontline Member States’ responsibility pre-
sents an ‘intentional’ misconception of the entire system. The crux of 
refugee crisis management problems breaks down precisely at this point. 
Namely, the Dublin Regulation is not the only concept of allocating Mem-
ber States’ responsibility for processing asylum claims within the existing 
framework of the CEAS.
In addition to the Dublin system, the CEAS provides for another con-
cept of determining the responsible Member State – the one provided for 
by the Temporary Protection Directive.103 Unlike the Dublin Regulation, 
the system of temporary protection provides that, in crisis situations, 
all the Member States share responsibility for protecting refugees on the 
basis of solidarity.104 Moreover, this system was specifically designed as 
a scheme of offering international protection in cases of ‘mass influx of 
refugees’ onto the Union territory, which is the underlying reason for its 
existence.105 
The Temporary Protection Directive was introduced into the Com-
mon European Asylum System back in 2001, following the experiences 
of the EU Member States dealing with unprecedented flows of Kosovar 
refugees displaced by the conflict in former Yugoslavia.106 In essence, the 
its territory illegally. This applies equally to all Member States where refugees resided il-
legally, resulting in transfers all the way back to the Member State of first entry into the 
Union territory, as a chain reaction. See Article 13 of the Dublin Regulation, as well as Di-
rective 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for return-
ing illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98.
103 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving tempo-
rary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promot-
ing a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the 
consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12 (hereinafter: Temporary Protection Directive).
104 ibid, recitals 7 and 9, Article 25(1).
105 ibid, recital 2.
106 ibid, recitals 3-9.
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Temporary Protection Directive codified into the Union legal framework 
the rules of coordinated action by the EU Member States in the humani-
tarian evacuation of Kosovar refugees to temporary safety.107
The temporary protection system, as implemented in the Union le-
gal order, is not a new concept on the global scale. An initially envisaged 
variation thereof was first mentioned in the 1969 African refugee con-
vention.108 It was also ‘promoted during mass flows from Southeast Asia 
and vigorously debated in the context of flight from Central American 
civil wars in the 1980s’.109 The first coherent structure of the temporary 
protection scheme was described in the UNHCR’s 1994 Report on Inter-
national Protection.110 The general purpose of this legal instrument was 
to provide the international community with a tangible solution to deal-
ing with sudden mass influxes of refugees. It is an ‘emergency response 
to the large-scale movement of asylum-seekers, providing immediate pro-
tection from refoulement and basic minimum treatment’.111
In the EU context, this system was designed in the following manner. 
Article 1.1(a) of the Directive defines ‘temporary protection’ as a pro-
cedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx 
or imminent mass influx, all displaced persons with immediate and tem-
porary protection, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum 
system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for 
its efficient operation. In that sense, temporary protection is an entirely 
different status from asylum, an entirely different mode of international 
protection.
The essential characteristic of this system may be seen from the fol-
lowing fact. General asylum procedures under CEAS grant protection to 
specific individuals who meet the necessary requirements to be granted 
asylum.112 On the other hand, temporary protection offers international 
107 See Council Resolution on burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of 
displaced persons on a temporary basis [1996] OJ C262/1; Action Plan of the Council and 
the Commission [1999] OJ C19/1.
108 Organization of African Unity, Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, opened for signature 10 September 1969, 1000 UNTS 46 (entered into force 20 June 
1974).
109 J Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’ 
(2000) 94(2) American Journal of International Law 279, 279.
110 UNHCR, Note on International Protection, UN Doc A/AC96/830 (1994) 23.
111 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ‘Guidelines on Temporary Protection or 
Stay Arrangements’ (February 2014) <http://www.unhcr.org/542e99fd9.pdf> accessed 5 
December 2015
112 See Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Decem-
ber 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ 
L337/9; and Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
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protection to groups, that is, all displaced persons coming to the Union 
territory in a mass influx, those who are unable to return to their country 
of origin in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevail-
ing in that country (for example, because they fled areas of armed conflict 
or endemic violence113 or because they were subject to systematic or gen-
eralised violations of their human rights).114 
In procedural terms, the temporary protection mechanism is activat-
ed in a special simplified legislative procedure – when the Council adopts 
a Decision by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission, 
submitted on the Commission’s own behalf or following a request made 
by any of the Member States.115 The European Parliament does not par-
ticipate in the decision-making process, but is merely informed of the 
Council Decision.116
Based on the Commission’s assessment of the emergency situation 
and the scale of arrivals into the Union, the Council Decision would au-
tomatically designate a group of beneficiaries of temporary protection 
(those who satisfy the Directive requirements – they fled armed conflict, 
endemic violence or systematic and generalised violations of their human 
rights). This would apply likewise when the beneficiary group spontane-
ously arrives in mass numbers onto the Union borders, but also in the 
case of their assisted evacuation into the EU from endangered areas in 
third countries.117 The Council Decision would furthermore specify the 
date on which the temporary protection would take effect, but would also 
pre-designate the quotas – in figures or in general terms – for the recep-
tion capacities of the Member States. The quotas would be determined in 
the Council Decision based on the information received from the Member 
States on their reception capacities. The Council would also consider the 
information received from the Commission, other Union institutions, the 
UNHCR and other relevant international organisations.118 
Pursuant to the Council Decision, all individuals belonging to a 
group of designated beneficiaries (for example, all Syrian refugees flee-
ing from armed conflict in their country of origin) would automatically be 
granted temporary protection status as soon they reach Union borders, 
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protec-
tion [2013]  OJ L180/60.
113 At this point, the author would just like to note the resemblance of this definition with 
the mass displacement of Syrian nationals in the ongoing refugee crisis.
114 Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Art 1.1(c).
115 ibid, Art 5(1).
116 ibid, Art 5(5).
117 ibid, Article 2.1(d). Also note that assisted evacuation into the EU would be a concept 
similar to the ‘resettlement’ of displaced persons. 
118 ibid, Article 5(3). 
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without any need for conducting individual and detailed assessments 
impossible to perform in the context of a mass influx. This, of course, 
is without prejudice to the Member States being allowed to exclude a 
person from entry into their territory and from temporary protection for 
public security reasons if there are serious grounds for regarding that 
this person committed a serious crime.119 Beneficiaries of the protection 
would then, subject to their own consent, be transferred from the Mem-
ber State in which they crossed the Union border into one of the other 
EU Member States, pursuant to a proportionate system of transfers to all 
Member States in line with the quotas designated in the Council Deci-
sion. All transfers would take place through administrative and operative 
cooperation between the national authorities of the Member States.120
As previously stated, the status of temporary protection would be 
granted to all displaced persons as soon as they reach Union territory. 
This would mean that the Member State of entry would instantly issue for 
them a short-term residence permit, making their stay in the Union ter-
ritory automatically legal. Once displaced persons are transferred to the 
Member State of their destination, they would be issued with a new resi-
dence permit from that Member State. In addition to the residence per-
mit, persons under temporary protection would automatically receive an 
entire set of rights that are, however, of a lesser scope than provided for 
by virtue of the asylum status. These rights would include: limited access 
to employment,121 access to suitable accommodation and, if necessary, 
the means to obtain housing, emergency health care and essential treat-
ment of illness, medical assistance to persons with special needs, access 
to education for minors, representation of unaccompanied minors, and a 
limited right122 to family reunification.123
The system of protection provided to displaced persons pursuant 
to this Directive, according to its wording, would last only for a limited 
period – three years at the maximum. The duration of the temporary pro-
tection scheme, under which displaced persons are protected, as well as 
accepted into the Union territory, would initially be one year. This period 
could be extended automatically by six monthly periods for a maximum 
119 For more information on exclusions based on public security, see the Temporary Protec-
tion Directive (n 103), Article 28
120 See the Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Art 26. Coordinated transfers under this 
system seem fairly interesting in the context of the current refugee crisis – taking into ac-
count the Western Balkans route often subjecting refugees to inhumane conditions on their 
path to reach Germany.
121 Member States could give priority to EU and EEA citizens, as well as legally resident 
third country nationals who receive unemployment benefits.
122 Spouses, partners, minor children and dependants (close family members who lived in a 
family unit).
123 See the Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Arts 8-16.
98 Nika Bačić Selanec: A Critique of EU Refugee Crisis Management: On Law, Policy and ...
of one year. If, however, the reasons for temporary protection persist, the 
Council may again decide by a qualified majority to extend that tempo-
rary protection by up to one year.124
The most significant aspect of the EU temporary protection scheme 
lies in the fact that temporary protection does not prejudice recognition 
of refugee status under the Qualification Directive (and the Geneva Con-
vention) – meaning that individual persons enjoying temporary protection 
must be able at all times to lodge an application for asylum as a more 
permanent status of international protection.125 
Furthermore, and even more importantly for the purposes of this 
article – the Member State that is ab initio responsible for examining asy-
lum claims of persons under temporary protection is solely the Member 
State to which they were transferred pursuant to the quota system of the 
temporary protection scheme, and not the Member State in which they 
took their first step onto Union territory.126 The importance of this provi-
sion cannot be overstated, as it establishes within the existing framework 
of the CEAS a system of determining the Member States responsible for 
examining asylum applications that exists in addition to the Dublin Reg-
ulation. Moreover, this system of Member State responsibility for refu-
gees, unlike the Dublin Regulation, is per se designated for crisis situa-
tions. By introducing the Temporary Protection Directive, the Union itself 
admitted it is necessary to establish a mechanism for events of mass 
influx of displaced persons that promotes a balance of efforts between 
the Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiv-
ing such persons – ‘for reasons of effectiveness, coherence and solidarity 
and in order, in particular, to avert the risk of secondary movements’.127
Temporary protection, along with the limited rights attached to 
that status, in itself is indeed a lesser degree of protection than what 
is currently required by international refugee law (namely, by the Ge-
neva Convention which binds all the EU Member States).128 However, 
no such concerns of possible violations of the Geneva obligations arise 
in the EU context – precisely because temporary protection rules are in-
stantly paired with a provision that allows all persons under temporary 
protection to seek asylum. This is a provision that, moreover, introduces 
a mechanism of true solidarity in sharing responsibility for processing 
asylum applications among all the Member States.
124 ibid, Art 4.
125 ibid, Arts 3(1) and 17(1).
126 ibid, Art 18.
127 ibid, recitals 8 and 9
128 M Bulterman, W van Genugten (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
2013: Crisis and International Law: Decoy or Catalyst? (TMC Asser Press 2014) 73.
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In other words, this type of protection allows EU Member States ‘to 
offer temporary protection to groups, and deal with the individual cases 
later’. In this sense, temporary protection allows EU Member States to 
efficiently deal with mass inflows of refugees. ‘While [asylum] law deals 
with refugees individually, temporary protection would allow [dealing] 
with a refugee crisis … Once a mass influx of refugees subsides, [Member 
States may return] from temporary to “normal” refugee protection’.129 
Considering all the aforementioned, one might doubtlessly say that 
temporary protection paired with the relocation of asylum responsibility 
in true solidarity is, by its very definition, ‘a Dublin alternative’.  Precisely 
this point makes the Temporary Protection Directive the EU’s strongest 
weapon in the arsenal of legal measures available for dealing with a refu-
gee crisis. 
However, as all seemingly perfect measures must have a catch, in-
deed so does the Temporary Protection Directive. From the provisions 
of the Directive, it cannot be ascertained beyond doubt that the Council 
can, as a matter of law, impose quotas on Member States who refuse to 
take part in the temporary protection scheme – those who were outvoted 
in the qualified majority decision-making process. In the real-life context 
where certain Member States challenge the imposition of quotas even in a 
small-scale relocation system,130 this instantly poses a pressing question.
The answer, however, is not that simple and raises complicated is-
sues, such as EU competences, subsidiarity, harmonisation, literal and 
teleological interpretation of the Directive and its proposals, the travaux 
préparatoires, the legal setting within the Treaties, etc – matters which 
would ultimately be for the Court of Justice to decide. That is why the 
author will address these issues in the simplest terms necessary for the 
current discussion. 
The problem arises because the Directive does not explicitly refer to 
situations in which one of the Member States refuses to accept quotas, 
or denies the Council access to information on its reception capacities. It 
simply states that ‘Member States shall receive persons who are eligible 
for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity and shall 
indicate [to the Council] – in figures or in general terms – their capacity 
to receive such persons’.131 These capacity indications would then be in-
cluded in the Council decision.132 However, capacity figures subjectively 
provided for by the Member States are not the only ones included in the 
129 ibid.
130 Referring to the announcements of Hungary and Slovakia to challenge quotas for reloca-
tion imposed through a Council decision brought by qualified majority.
131 Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Art 25.
132 ibid, Art 5.3(c).
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Council Decision. The Council Decision must also take into account the 
objective information received from UNHCR and other relevant interna-
tional organisations, but also the information received from the Commis-
sion itself.133 This could be interpreted as to mean that there is nothing to 
prevent the Council from introducing quotas that differ from the recep-
tion capacity communicated by the Member States.
The only startling term in the Directive that would suggest otherwise 
is Article 18 thereof, stating that a Member State responsible for asy-
lum applications of persons enjoying temporary protection is the Mem-
ber State that accepted the transfer onto its territory. At first sight, this 
seems to indicate that Member States have the right not to accept the 
transfers. However, it says nothing decisive on the issue of the Council 
imposing initial quotas, irrespective of the latter transfers. Nonetheless, 
should this issue occur, the author would not hesitate to claim134 that 
quotas (defined as indicators of Member States’ capacity) can indeed be 
imposed on those Member States, as a matter of law.135 
The arguments for proving this claim could be formed as follows. It 
must be recalled that the Temporary Protection Directive is a full-fledged 
part of Title V TFEU and the harmonised Common European Asylum 
System. Within Title V, all measures are decided by default in an ordinary 
legislative procedure in which certain Member States may be outvoted.136 
Moreover, the Council Decision of activating the temporary protection 
scheme is in the very wording of the Directive made by a ‘qualified major-
ity’. The Council Decision is also stated to have the effect of introducing 
133 The Commission’s assessment for determining the quotas for allocation could undoubt-
edly be based on objective information gathered from other Union institutions, such as 
Frontex, EASO and Eurostat, as was the case with the distribution key set for the relocation 
scheme mechanism under Article 78(3) TFEU. 
134 Not all authors would agree on this point. See, for example, M Garlick and J van Selm, 
‘From Commitment to Practice: The EU Response’ (2012) 39 Forced Migration Review 20 
<http://www.fmreview.org/north-africa/garlick-vanselm.html#sthash.iewe7fJK.dpuf> ac-
cessed 30 December 2015:  ‘The Directive contains no binding obligation for Member States 
to receive people admitted under temporary protection to other States’. 
135 The question remains, however, on how quotas would be imposed on Member States 
who refuse to accept the transfers in practice – in other words, would Member States accept 
those transfers (even if they have the right not to accept)? Yet again, this is a very similar 
issue to the one that currently emerges with imposing quotas on Member States in the sys-
tem of relocations under Article 78(3) TFEU. The problem could hypothetically be resolved 
by the Commission’s recourse to infringement proceedings against the relevant Member 
State, pursuant to Article 258 TFEU. 
136 This would also mean that, even if the Temporary Protection Directive were to be in-
terpreted as meaning that the Council cannot impose quotas on the Member States, the 
Directive could easily be amended so as to explicitly specify the contrary. Amendments are 
introduced in an ordinary legislative procedure with the Council’s qualified majority vote. 
The same was done with the relocation scheme being proposed as an amendment to the 
Dublin Regulation.
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temporary protection for displaced persons in all the Member States.137 
Furthermore, when a sudden and massive influx into the Union terri-
tory exceeds the reception capacities indicated by the Member States 
themselves, the Council is obliged, as a matter of urgency, to examine 
the situation and take appropriate action.138 This would mean that, if the 
Member States did not wish to proceed with quotas on a voluntary basis, 
the Council is called upon to act.
The aforementioned arguments could support the conclusion that 
the temporary protection mechanism may indeed be legally imposed on 
all the Member States. This is also strengthened by the fact that the 
preamble of the Directive defines a mechanism of temporary protection 
in the spirit of solidarity as the ‘actual reception’ of displaced persons 
in the Member States – which is specifically relevant because the initial 
Commission Proposal of the Directive139 stated that the mechanism of 
solidarity entails reception of displaced persons ‘on the basis of a volun-
tary action by the receiving Member States’.140 There must have been a 
reason why this underlying explanation of the Directive was amended in 
the course of the legislative procedure.141 The final text of the Directive 
was similarly amended on various other instances, as compared to what 
the Commission initially intended – removing all referrals to the Member 
137 Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Art 5(1). It is important to note that the Directive 
applies to all Member States except Denmark. Even the UK and Ireland, generally excluded 
from Title V measures pursuant to a Protocol annexed to the Treaties, gave notice of their 
wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive.
138 ibid, Art 25(3). Admittedly, appropriate action is stated to include (though not exclusive-
ly) recommending additional support for the affected Member States. However, nothing in 
the Article precluded Council action of a different kind, such as reviewing the Decision ini-
tially introducing temporary protection. In this context, it is also interesting to note that the 
initial Commission proposal of the Temporary Protection Directive did not include urgent 
and appropriate actions of the Council if the capacities designated by the Member States 
prove to be insufficient for handling the massive influx. Even more interestingly, the initial 
Directive proposal did not prescribe that the Council Decision must, in addition to the 
information received from the Member States, also take into account information provided 
for by the Commission, UNHCR and other relevant international organisations. Quite the 
contrary, the Proposal, as compared to the final text of the Directive, went more clearly in 
favour of the Member States – stating that only declarations by the Member States on their 
reception capacities would be included in the Council Decision. There must be a reason why 
the initial proposal was amended as to leave more leeway for the Council.
139 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection 
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance 
of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences 
thereof /* COM/2000/0303 final - CNS 2000/0127 [2000] OJ C311 E. 
140 Temporary Protection Directive (n 103), recital 20 (emphasis added).
141 An explanation of the Commission’s resilience in proposing a stronger piece of legislation 
might be found in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal (para 6.1): ‘The Commis-
sion considers that the question of physical distribution must be settled by the Community 
legislation … But only a physical distribution based on the voluntary action of the Member 
States will found a consensus in the EU’.
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States’ voluntary and decisive role in the application of the scheme.142 
The Union legislator obviously aimed at leaving this matter ambiguous, 
with a certain agenda in mind. Although the introduced Proposal amend-
ments do not provide a definitive answer, they give the benefit of the 
doubt to the fact that quotas could indeed be imposed.  The textual ambi-
guity was most likely left there for a reason, so as to provide more leeway 
for the Council and the Commission in the expected political struggles 
with Member States when pushing for the activation of the temporary 
protection mechanism.
Nonetheless, even if this entire issue is set aside, and even if the tem-
porary protection scheme were based on the Member States’ voluntary 
action, this in no way undermines the importance of the Temporary Pro-
tection Directive and its system of solidarity in determining the Member 
States responsible for asylum seekers. In the worst-case scenario, where 
this scheme were activated for 23 or even 15 out of 27 Member States,143 
all the benefits of temporary protection would still outweigh all the core 
drawbacks of the current EU crisis management technique – insisting on 
the Dublin system as the default rule and introducing exceptions thereto 
in order to prevent the system from completely falling apart.
Firstly, unlike the Dublin exceptions where the primary responsibil-
ity for asylum seekers still stays on the frontline Member States but is 
then taken over by other Member States, the temporary protection sys-
tem designated all (participating) Member States ab initio responsible for 
asylum seekers. Apart from taking care of the current political struggles 
of the frontline Member States to prevent returns of asylum seekers onto 
their territory by invoking Dublin rules, this system would introduce true 
crisis solidarity within the full meaning of that word.
Secondly, temporary protection would also give immediate status to 
all those displaced persons arriving on Union territory without impos-
ing on them the Dublin obligation of applying for asylum in the front-
line Member State – an obligation that is, under the currently applied 
relocation mechanisms, a precondition for those persons to be relocated 
to other Member States. It would also allow the Union to be realistic in 
terms of numbers. 
In the first eight months of 2015, approximately 76 out of 116,000 
refugees who arrived in Italy did not seek asylum in that country. For 
Greece, the situation is even worse – asylum was sought by only 8 out of 
211,000 refugees.144 And all these shocking numbers do not include, for 
142 See also n 138. 
143 The Directive applies to all Member States except Denmark. See n 137.
144 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary’ COM (2015) 
451 final 2015/0209 (NLE) recital 12.
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the most part, the statistics of the Western Balkans route from the sec-
ond part of 2015 – where 145,000 refugees passed through Hungary145 
and 465,000 through Croatia.146 Furthermore, only Germany will accept 
approximately one million refugees in 2015, none of whom fall within the 
category of those who sought asylum in frontline Member States.147 Un-
der these circumstances, it is not hard to see what real-life effect Article 
78(3) TFEU on the relocation system for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
actually has on the course of the present refugee crisis. The effect is mar-
ginal, but just enough so that nobody can say that the centralised Union 
is doing absolutely nothing substantive to tackle the refugee crisis.
Despite all these legal interpretations, facts, numbers and com-
mon sense, the system of temporary protection has not been activated. 
In 2013, the Parliament148 did call on the Commission to consider this 
system as one of the options for handling current and future inflows of 
Syrian refugees – which all happened very early after the commencement 
of the Syrian civil war. Since then, however, no European institution has 
invoked this option for the ongoing refugee crisis. The system was not 
publically considered at all, except for a few authors and NGOs invoking 
it as the most practical and efficient framework for the EU to deal with 
mass influx situations, while at the same time safeguarding the funda-
mental rights of refugees.149
145 ibid. Interestingly, 98 out of 148,000 refugees (mostly unregistered in Greece) sought 
asylum in Hungary under the Dublin rules in the first 8 months of 2015. That is, before 
Hungary closed its borders with Serbia in mid September 2015 and before the Western 
Balkans route was redirected to Croatia. This is particularly relevant in the context where 
Janos Lazar, the minister in charge of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office, makes public 
statements that refugees should be returned to Greece where they had first entered the EU. 
See ‘Hungary “will not accept” refugees from other EU states (World Bulletin, 30 October 
2015) <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/165806/hungary-will-not-accept-refugees-
from-other-eu-state> accessed 28 December 2015. 
146 See Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, ‘Information on Accepting and 
Accommodating Migrants in Croatia’ <http://www.mup.hr/219671.aspx> accessed 5 De-
cember 2015. 
147 See ‘One Million Refugees may Arrive in Germany This Year’ (Al Jazeera, 14 Septem-
ber 2015) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/million-refugees-arrive-germany-
year-150914101006005.html accessed 30 November 2015, or ‘Germany Expects up to 1.5 
Million Asylum Seekers in 2015, Says Report’ (The Guardian, 5 October 2015) <http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/germany-now-expects-up-to-15-mln-migrants-in-
2015-report> accessed on 30 November 2015. Other Member States such as Sweden, Aus-
tria, France, etc, also took in their fair share of refugees. The author will however focus on 
the German example as the most drastic case.
148 European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU and Member State measures 
to tackle the flow of refugees as a result of the conflict in Syria (2013/2837(RSP)), para 14: 
‘[The Parliament] calls on the Commission … to work on contingency planning, including 
the possibility of applying the Temporary Protection Directive, if and when conditions de-
mand it’.
149 See, for example M Ineli-Ciger, ‘The Missing Piece in the European Agenda on Migra-
tion: The Temporary Protection Directive’ (EU Law Analysis, 8 July 2015) <http://eulawa-
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The mechanism of the Temporary Protection Directive has, actually, 
never been activated in the European Union. The only official request to 
the Commission to consider drafting a proposal for activation was made 
by Italy in 2011, in the context of the Libyan refugees crossing the Medi-
terranean in boats trying to reach the Italian shores. Although initially 
the Commission did consider it,150 the proposal was never submitted 
to the Council. The Commission believed there was no need for tempo-
rary protection in that situation due to the limited number of arrivals.151 
Drawing from the Kosovo experience that motivated the drafting of the 
Directive, the number of people fleeing Libya was considered insufficient 
when compared to the 500,000 that were fleeing Kosovo. The same logic 
of comparison with the Kosovo situation was, however, never used in 
the context of the current refugee crisis where the number of displaced 
persons on their way to the territory of the Union is more than twice the 
size.152  
nalysis.blogspot.hr/2015/07/the-missing-piece-in-european-agenda-on.html> accessed 
28 December 2015; C Orchard and A Miller, ‘Protection in Europe for Refugees from Syria’ 
(Forced Migration Policy Briefing 10, September 2014) <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/
publications/policy-briefing-series/pb10-protection-europe-refugees-syria-2014.pdf> ac-
cessed 28 December 2015; C Orchard and D Chatty, ‘ High Time for Europe to Offer Tempo-
rary Protection to Refugees from Syria?’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, October 2014)  <http://
ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/high-time-for-europe-to-offer-temporary-protection-to-refugees-from-
syria/> accessed 28 December 2015; E De Capitani, ‘Mediterranean Humanitarian Crisis: 
If Not Now, Then When Will the EU  Trigger the “Temporary Protection” Mechanism”?’ (Eu-
ropean Area of Freedom Security Justice, April 2015) <http://free-group.eu/2015/04/20/
mediterranean-humanitarian-crisis-if-not-now-when-the-eu-will-trigger-the-temporary-
protection-mechanism/> accessed 28 December 2015;  Human Rights Watch, ‘EU: Provide 
Protection for Syrian Refugees: Allow Access to EU Territory, Step Up Assistance in Region’ 
(23 December 2012)  <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/23/eu-provide-protection-
syrian-refugees> accessed 28 December 2015; Boston University International Human 
Rights Clinic, ‘Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Shar-
ing’ <http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/programs/clinics/international-human-rights/
documents/FINALFullReport.pdf> accessed 28 December 2015. 
150 The Commission, in turn, only considered introducing a temporary situation in 2011 for 
the refugees fleeing conflict in Libya. See Commission Press Release, ‘The European Com-
mission’s Response to the Migratory Flows from North Africa, 8 April 2011, MEMO/11/226 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-226_en.htm?locale=fr> accessed 28 
December 2015: ‘The Commission would also be ready to consider proposing the use of 
the mechanism foreseen under the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive, if the conditions 
foreseen in the directive are met. Consideration could only be given to taking this step if 
it is clear that the persons concerned are likely to be in need of international protection, if 
they cannot be safely returned to their countries-of-origin, and if the numbers of persons 
arriving who are in need of protection are sufficiently great. Resort to this mechanism would 
allow for the immediate protection and reception in the territory of EU Member States for 
persons concerned, as well as offering a “breathing space” for the national asylum systems 
of the Member States most directly affected’. 
151 M Garlick and J van Selm, ‘From Commitment to Practice: The EU Response’ (Forced 
Migration Review) <http://www.fmreview.org/north-africa/garlick-vanselm.html#sthash.
iewe7fJK.dpuf> accessed 28 December 2015.  
152 Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to comprehend the refusal to activate the 
system for the numbers in 2015. The only difference in treatment that one could plainly see 
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Under these circumstances, one cannot but wonder why temporary 
protection was never put on the Union’s table. 
The initial reaction might be its ambiguous referral to the voluntary 
participation of the Member States. In other words, some Member States 
could simply refuse to participate. However, the arguments presented 
above prove exactly why the temporary protection system, even if acti-
vated only in some of the EU Member States, is more effective in tack-
ling mass inflows than any possible Dublin exception. Moreover, nothing 
would prevent the Union from introducing legislative amendments to the 
Temporary Protection Directive so as to remove these textual ambigui-
ties and solve the situation, just as it did with the relocations schemes 
through Article 78(3) TFEU or the proposed amendments to the Dublin 
Regulation. 
The refugees that have recently arrived in the EU illegally could as 
well have arrived onto the Union territory legally. The inflows would most 
likely be less drastic, as the temporary protection system would include 
only the most affected nationalities of refugees, thus discouraging those 
who do not qualify from joining the masses entering the Union territory. 
By reducing this pull factor, there would also be fewer abuses of the EU 
asylum system. Truly displaced persons could have been transferred to 
Member States of destination through a temporary protection scheme in 
precisely the same numbers as the existing ones, only through a more 
coordinated (EU financed) system of transfers.153 Sticking to the Dublin 
rules, with the marginal impact of Dublin exceptions, led to most of the 
displaced persons creating the Western Balkans route, and in the end 
reaching their destination anyway. Money and operating capacities could 
have been spent on coordinated transfer activities, instead of on fortify-
ing the border controls in EU Member States on the Western Balkans 
route, even between the EU Member States themselves, inside or outside 
the Schengen system. In other words, nothing would have changed re-
garding the number of actual receptions into the EU – only the status of 
displaced persons would not have been illegal and outside the Union law 
framework, but legal. The application of this system could have increased 
confidence that the EU could provide an adequate legal and operative 
between the situation in Kosovo and the one currently ongoing is the ethnic origin and reli-
gion of the displaced persons. Note, however, Article 21 of the Charter: ‘Any discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, lan-
guage, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’ (emphasis added). 
The Charter is, pursuant to Article 51, addressed to all Union institutions and all Member 
States when they are implementing Union law – such as the Temporary Protection Directive, 
or, to the same extent, any other aspect of the Common European Asylum System.
153 See Temporary Protection Directive (n 103) Art 24. Measures undertaken pursuant to 
this Directive would be financed from the European Refugee Fund. 
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framework for tackling the refugee crisis, even if only for those Member 
States who wish to participate.
5 Consequences of misconception: EU decentralisation 
As described in the previous section, all possible justifications about 
why temporary protection was not activated could be repudiated as a 
matter of fact or as a matter of law. However, even if the reasons why 
temporary protection was not invoked are unclear, this does not mean 
that there is no underlying rationalisation. The misconception of the EU’s 
management technique of handling the refugee crisis cannot be ‘unin-
tentional’. No one could ever claim that temporary protection was never 
contemplated, or that the Commission or the Council just forgot that this 
Directive existed within the framework of the Common European Asylum 
System.
There could be many explanations for the present outcome. However, 
the author’s position is that temporary protection was never invoked due 
to pure politics at the level of the centralised Union and its institutions.
For the European Union in its centralised capacity, the Dublin ex-
ceptions route that was taken is much less costly, politically speaking. 
In other words, it is much easier for Union institutions to try things out 
with small-scale relocations within the Dublin system of responsibility 
sharing which is still suitable for the majority of EU Member States. As 
a consequence, the minority of frontline Member States remain at fault 
for the disastrous scale of refugee migrations in the EU. The route taken 
does not require much political will or strength, as it proves to be much 
easier than mobilising the entire EU (or the majority of its Member States) 
with a temporary protection mechanism. If the system introduced by the 
centralised EU does not work large-scale, the EU would be the one to 
blame for the system and for the Union border controls falling apart. 
Sticking to the responsibility of frontline Member States who must be 
helped, instead of seeing this as a true problem of solidarity of the Union 
as a whole, allows the central EU institutions to point the finger at some-
body else. 
Masking the shortcomings in the EU crisis management with invo-
cations of superficial solidarity hides the fact that the Union has failed to 
fulfil its own responsibilities towards the Member States. It is important 
to note that the Union itself is obliged to confront the refugee crisis. By 
taking over competences in asylum and migration matters under Title V, 
and by harmonising the legal framework of the Common European Asy-
lum System, the Union took over responsibility from the Member States 
to ensure their compliance with the Geneva Convention. In other words, 
it was the Union’s role to activate the system that would provide a legal 
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and more efficient framework for the Member States to respond to migra-
tory pressures. However, instead of activating temporary protection and 
an emergency system of asylum claims responsibility envisaged for situ-
ations of mass influx, the EU still forces the Dublin system as a default, 
introducing into that system a set of diverse exceptions whose overall 
effect is nothing but marginal in the given context. The Union failed to 
provide a more efficient response to the migratory pressures available in 
its own legal framework in time, and is now covering its tracks.
As a result of Union inaction, it was the Member States who took 
the wheel and placed themselves in charge of handling the refugee cri-
sis, each on its own behalf. The marginal results of the Union Agenda 
measures effectively mean that the EU stepped aside as the main actor 
of refugee crisis management, creating the perfect ground for Member 
States to invoke their own political particularities and national interests. 
The outcome was polarisation of the Member States – the first step in 
creating a two-fold Europe, each day moving farther away from the ever-
closer Union.154
The first fraction of the Member States, led by Germany, took over 
the responsibility of international refugee protection from the European 
Union. In a constitutional context, one might see this as a reverse sub-
sidiarity situation, where certain Member States took over the compe-
tence in asylum law and policy from the Union which proved to be inca-
pable of handling the situation itself.155 These Member States followed 
their obligations arising from the Geneva Convention, thus also saving 
the European Union from being accused of violating refugees’ fundamen-
tal rights.156 They stepped up when the central EU response fell short. 
Whatever their motives, whether compensating for the past, adhering to 
fundamental rights or purely humanitarian grounds, it was only one part 
of the Member States who took the burden for Europe. However, the only 
way for those Member States to do so was to disregard the existing Union 
154 To that extent, it is interesting to note that Jean-Claude Juncker himself started publicly 
speaking about a two-speed Europe: ‘One day we should rethink the European architecture 
with a group of countries that will do things, all things, together, and others that will posi-
tion themselves in an orbit away from the core’. See E Zalan, ‘Juncker Foresees Two-Speed 
Europe (EUobserver, 10 November 2015) <https://euobserver.com/institutional/131172> 
accessed 28 December 2015. This seemingly marginal statement of the EU’s highest execu-
tive official may, however, uncover the true vision for the future of Union.
155 This argument is specifically interesting in the German context and the Solange saga: 
because the EU response fell short of the level of protection of fundamental rights required 
by the German Basic Law, Germany no longer recognises the supremacy of EU law and is 
allowed, in its national constitutional capacity, to put Union rules on the CEAS out of effect.
156 Taking over the competences in asylum matters, but not activating an effective emer-
gency system capable of handling the existing refugee crisis, the Union could de facto be 
responsible for violations of the Geneva Convention. Luckily, the EU is currently saved by 
efforts of these individual Member States who took over the role of providing international 
protection to refugees.
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asylum rules, effectively putting out of force and out of practice the EU 
Dublin Regulation. In a way, the good guys of the story created anarchy 
in Union asylum law.157 
As previously stated, the Western Balkans route was developed as a 
by-product of Germany accepting a ‘million’ refugees in order to adhere 
to the Geneva Convention. It is thus quite ironic to observe that it was 
precisely this Western Balkans route that resulted in a chain reaction 
that turned Member States against each other, practically disregarding 
the entire Union legal framework on asylum. The result was systematic 
failures to register refugees and illegal migrants; the crushing of the Un-
ion’s external and internal borders; massive inflows of refugees in Hun-
gary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, etc; unregulated secondary movements; 
inhumane treatment of refugees along the route; human trafficking and 
smuggling; and the collapse of the much needed control of borders for 
security reasons.158 
Quite conveniently, this situation also created a perfect excuse for 
the formation of a second fraction of EU Member States – those who op-
pose accepting refugees and who challenge the quotas for relocations (for 
quite marginal numbers as compared to the overall EU acceptance rates); 
those soliciting the closing of European borders; those who build fenc-
es and surround the Union’s external and internal borders with barbed 
wire; those who invoke Schengen exceptions to the point where a ‘Union 
without internal borders’ makes no practical sense whatsoever.159 Some 
of these actions may well be radical, and some could be justified under 
current circumstances. Altogether, they serve to further deepen the exist-
ing divergences between the Member States’ individual national interests.
It is precisely at this point that the convenience of using a temporary 
protection schemes must again be emphasised. 
157 Admittedly, some might claim that Germany is acting within the scope of the Dublin 
Regulation by using the sovereignty clause exception (Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation), 
which allows taking over the responsibility of examining asylum applications from another 
Member State. In the context of Germany taking over more than a million refugees, two-
thirds of the entire number of refugees currently in the EU, invoking this exception of the 
Dublin Regulation could only be seen as stretching the system to absurd lengths.
158 An attempt to handle the chaos of the Western Balkans route was also subject to a spe-
cial meeting of leaders of affected EU and non-EU states on 25 October 2015. See Leaders’ 
Meeting on Refugee Flows Along the Western Balkans Route, ‘Leaders’ Statement’ <http://
ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.pdf> accessed 28 December 2015.
Furthermore, the security reasons seem specifically prudent in the aftermath of the 13 No-
vember 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.
159 For more information on invoking exceptions to the Schengen system, see S Peers, ‘Can 
Schengen Be Suspended Because of Greece? Should It Be?’ (EU Law Analysis, 2 December 
2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.hr/2015/12/can-schengen-be-suspended-because-
of.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+EuLawAnaly
sis+(EU+Law+Analysis)> accessed 28 December 2015.
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Temporary protection is not just a system that protects individual 
refugees under its scope. It also protects the EU Member States from 
the chaos that is an inevitable result of an unmanaged crisis. By auto-
matically granting protection to all those who fall within the definition 
of war-displaced refugees, a temporary protection scheme also reduces 
pressures at the external and internal borders. It comes with financial 
support and an administrative framework for cooperation among Mem-
ber States through a pre-designed system of coordinated transfers of ref-
ugees from the frontline countries to their final destination, minimising 
secondary movements. It also ensures that all the Member States take on 
part of the formal initial responsibility for processing asylum claims, thus 
relieving the Member States on the periphery from the pernicious politi-
cal pressure of being responsible and constantly fearing mass returns of 
refugees.
If a temporary protection scheme was activated in time, there might 
not have been the Western Balkans route, or at least not on the present 
scale. Operative resources could have been redirected to the external bor-
ders to more effectively safeguard entries into Union territory for the safe-
ty of all the EU Member States and all EU citizens. Financial resources 
could have been used, instead of for blankets and paying for barbed wire 
on the Union’s internal borders, for subsidising or financing the Member 
States’ efforts for transferring Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean refugees from 
Greece and Italy to the Member States of their destination. Internal EU 
borders would be safer, and there would be no need to close them in such 
a systematic manner. Schengen would perhaps function better. In other 
words, there would be no underlying reason for preventing secondary 
movements by putting up barbed fences between EU Member States and 
EU neighbours. In the context of the EU wrapped in barbed wire, even 
the ‘Fortress Europe’ attribution may start to seem an understatement. 
By using the temporary protection scheme in a timely manner, we could 
perhaps have avoided the existing chaos.
If this system were indeed applied in practice, nobody doubts that 
the Union would still face a number of problems it is facing anyway. Like 
all other theoretical ideals, temporary protection would surely result in a 
number of practical difficulties. If the EU had invoked it, there most cer-
tainly would have been a small mutiny of some Member States, accusing 
the Union of centralisation, competence theft and violations of their pub-
lic policy or public security exemptions. Furthermore, the system of coor-
dinated administrative and operative action for transfers would certainly 
not function as it should. Other practical difficulties would paralyse the 
system from time to time, as that is inherent in the very definition of a 
crisis situation.
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Nonetheless, it may be argued that one simple added value of a tem-
porary protection mechanism overcomes all the difficulties of EU refugee 
crisis management – EU Member States would have a Union-introduced 
legal system to work with. All efforts undertaken by the Member States 
would be within the existing Union legal framework. In other words, the 
Member States would not be forced by the Union’s own hand to effectively 
put the Dublin rules, and consequently the Union legal framework on 
asylum, out of effect.
6 Conclusion
By activating the European Agenda on Migration, the EU has imple-
mented a wide set of legal, financial and operative measures to face the 
challenges of the ongoing refugee crisis. Some of these measures aim to 
respond to what was classified as the most pressing duty of saving lives 
in the Mediterranean. The EU has also stepped up in the international 
arena to uphold its international obligations and values by assisting the 
third countries most affected. Alongside the humanitarian approach, the 
EU has also strongly committed itself to doing everything in its power to 
secure the Union’s external borders. The final set of emergency measures 
was then introduced to repair the existing legal framework on asylum, 
proven as dysfunctional when faced with the pressure of mass inflows 
of refugees. Overall, the European Union has indeed done more than 
any other significant actor in the Western world to respond to the hu-
manitarian crisis. For this reason, the overall critique of the EU crisis 
management technique must to a certain extent be attenuated. Nonethe-
less, considering the background of the EU’s commitment to introduce 
a coherent and effective asylum policy and legal framework, the author’s 
position is that the EU could have done it differently, and could have 
done better. 
The Agenda on Migration came about in the already existing context 
of a deficient Common European Asylum System. Yet the Dublin Regula-
tion for determining the Member States responsible for asylum seekers, 
being the core problem of the CEAS, was nonetheless placed as a starting 
point for all operative plans of EU crisis management within the Union 
territory. In other words, all Union measures introduced to address in-
ternally the crisis presuppose that the Dublin system is a default rule 
– starting from the presumption that initial legal responsibility lies with 
the frontline Member States who are then aided by measures for transfer-
ring that responsibility to other Member States. Diverse exceptions were 
introduced to the otherwise applicable Dublin rules, creating effects that 
are nothing but marginal in the given context. The most important excep-
tion to that extent – that is, the relocation of 200,000 people from Italy 
and Greece – legally covers only around 20% of the refugees accepted 
111CYELP 11 [2015] 73-114
overall into the Union territory in 2015. The remaining numbers of refu-
gees simply do not fall within the existing EU framework on asylum, but 
have been accepted through individual efforts of EU Member States.
The author submits that the reason for this inconsistency lies pre-
cisely in the EU’s misconception of basing the entire EU crisis manage-
ment measures on the Dublin presumption. The Dublin Regulation was 
simply not envisaged to function at a time of crisis. Introducing the excep-
tions to that already inefficient system was predestined to fail. Amend-
ing an inherently dysfunctional framework may well be seen as saving a 
system that cannot be saved in the given context. 
Ironically, the emergency legal setting was not something the Union 
was unequipped for during the crucial moments of creating the opera-
tive plan for the Agenda. The existing framework of the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System creates two quite different concepts for determining 
the Member State responsible for providing international protection to 
refugees. In addition to the Dublin Regulation, the CEAS also includes a 
responsibility-sharing mechanism prescribed in the Temporary Protec-
tion Directive.
In the words of the Commission, this Directive should be activated 
in cases of a mass influx of displaced persons in order to (1) deal with the 
influx in a uniform, balanced and effective way, based on solidarity;  (2) 
ensure that the default asylum system does not collapse, and (3) preserve 
intact the operation of the Geneva Convention.160 
The mere fact that the Temporary Protection Directive exists corrob-
orates the conclusion that the already dysfunctional Dublin Regulation is 
not the proper legal basis for the functioning of CEAS in crisis situations, 
but only in situations within the ‘normal’ sphere. Measures currently in-
troduced cannot be effective in practice when their legal setting is based 
on underlying assumptions that were not envisaged for emergency situa-
tions. In other words, the EU crisis management technique is simply set 
within the wrong legal framework.
At a time of crisis, the starting point should have been the initial 
shared responsibility of all Member States based on solidarity, precisely 
as envisaged in the Temporary Protection Directive. The Agenda itself 
recognises that, in emergency situations, no Member State can effec-
tively address migration alone. A new, more European approach based 
on solidarity would be needed.161 Unlike the Dublin first country of entry 
160 Commission Press Release, ‘Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Dis-
placed Persons’, ip/00/518, 24 May 2000 (press release following the Commission’s Pro-
posal for the Temporary Protection Directive) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
00-518_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 28 December 2015.
161 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 2.
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concept, a temporary protection mechanism presupposes that respon-
sibilities for refugees are mutual and binding on all the Member States. 
The current EU refugee crisis management nonetheless failed to 
invoke the temporary protection scheme envisaged to deal with the in-
flux in a balanced and effective way based on solidarity. If the temporary 
protection mechanism had been activated, the Union action would have 
been considered fully in line with the original purpose and function of the 
1951 Geneva Convention which was created in the aftermath of World 
War II, intending to provide international protection to all masses fleeing 
events occurring before 1951.162  
On the other hand, the Union’s current Dublin-based efforts result-
ed in a collapse of the EU asylum system and brought into question the 
conformity of the core set of EU actions with the Geneva Convention. The 
sole reason why the EU is currently not in breach of those international 
obligations is due to the unilateral actions of individual Member States 
that are outside the EU legal framework. Precisely because the EU forces 
Dublin as a default, it failed to provide Member States with efficient and 
working solutions to the unstoppable pressures of the incoming refugees. 
The EU has not done enough to create a functional legal system that is 
truly capable of tackling the refugee crisis of the present magnitude. In 
other words, by failing to recognise the core problems of its existing de-
fault approach to the Dublin Regulation, the EU allowed its own asylum 
system to collapse – simply by insisting on the application of the wrong 
European rules. 
By not providing Member States with a functioning legal framework 
to work with, the EU is forcing its Member States to act individually, al-
lowing their particular political interests to prevail. One part of the Mem-
ber States pursued those interests to fulfil the true Geneva purpose, thus 
taking on almost the entire burden for Europe. Most other Member States 
stepped aside, while some of them systematically kept closing their bor-
ders and building barbed wire fences between the EU Member States and 
EU neighbours in the name of salvaging the Dublin system. If the EU had 
indeed equipped the Member States with a decent framework for admin-
istrative cooperation and organised transfers accompanied by EU funds, 
perhaps there would not have been a West Balkans route that is causing 
most of the problems in preventing secondary movements. 
To that extent, it must be emphasised that temporary protection is 
envisaged to work for the benefit of the Member States, in addition to 
162 Before the 1967 Protocol expanded its territorial and temporal scope, so that the Con-
vention applies to all those who fall within the definition of a refugee. See Office of UNHCR, 
‘Introductory Note to the Geneva Convention’ <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html> 
accessed 28 December 2015. 
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upholding the fundamental rights of individual refugees. It reduces pres-
sures at the borders by providing for an administrative framework for 
the cooperative transfers of refugees from the frontline Member States 
to their destinations. This is a system that could have saved Member 
States from introducing exceptions to the Schengen system, and thus 
effectively putting out of practice the idea of a Europe without internal 
borders. Moreover, the temporary protection scheme would ensure that 
all Member States take on responsibility from the very beginning, reliev-
ing the frontline Member States from the pernicious political pressure 
of being the ones to blame for the chaos of secondary movements, while 
constantly fearing mass returns.
However, the policy choice of avoiding the temporary protection 
scheme could not have been unintentional on the side of the central EU 
institutions. Focusing on Dublin must be seen as a cognitive political 
choice, giving the Union institutions someone else to blame for the col-
lapse – namely, the frontline Member States who bear the initial respon-
sibility for the asylum seekers. In the real-life context, the crisis manage-
ment route chosen has proven to be even more inefficient. Furthermore, 
if the large-scale system of temporary protection was indeed proposed, 
and if the Member States disagreed, this would effectively bring to light 
that perhaps there was no European Union that was ever closer, and that 
the idea of Union integration based on solidarity exists only within the 
scope of the economic internal market. Mobilising the entire European 
Union contrary to the preferences of individual Member States (on such a 
politically sensitive issue such as asylum law) could suggest that there is 
no Union as a constitutional quasi-federal legal order based on common 
underlying values of fundamental rights protection with no individual 
exceptions.
The Agenda itself admits that 
one of the weaknesses exposed in the current policy has been the 
lack of mutual trust between Member States, notably as a result 
of the continued fragmentation of the asylum system…. But the 
EU has common rules which should already provide the basis for 
mutual confidence, and a further development of these rules will 
allow for a fresh start.163 
The measures chosen to activate the Agenda, however, were not 
those common rules that could have restored the invoked mutual confi-
dence. Quite the contrary, the path taken resulted in even further frag-
mentation of the asylum system where only one Member State takes al-
most two-thirds of the entire burden for Europe. The Union’s own choice 
163 Agenda on Migration (n 6) 6.
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has resulted in what the Agenda sought to attenuate – Member States 
growing even further apart. By refusing to confront these issues, the EU 
institutions avoid admitting that the ideal Union integration is currently 
facing its ultimate identity crisis and that the political particularities of 
individual Member States still condition the core selective unity for the 
peoples of Europe.
